

CLASSIFICATION AND MUTUAL RELATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES

(From the "Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review," 1860, Edited by Charles Hodge. While no author is specifically mentioned for this article it unquestionably has the approval of Charles Hodge, and seems to be written by him.)

"The accepted classification of the powers of the mind, until a comparatively recent period, was twofold - intellectual and voluntary, under the respective heads of understanding and will." p.49

"The intellect and will plainly differ from each other, as it is the province of the one to know; of the other to desire or choose. The formal object of the one is truth, of the other good; i.e. if we know anything, we know it as true. If we desire or choose anything, we desire or choose it as good; i.e. as worthy, lovely, or pleasant. It may, however, happen through the imperfection of our faculties that what we take for truth may prove false - and, though our depravity, that what we take for good, may be evil. Nevertheless, what the will chooses, it chooses under the notion of its being good; just as the intellect perceives a thing under the notion of its being true." p. 58

"1. That there can be no act of the will or optative faculties without some corresponding cognition of the intellect to guide it. It cannot chose to desire without light from the intellect to direct it. In the order of nature, too, if not of time, this intellectual apprehension or discernment, must precede the choice of the will, else how can it guide that choice? This however needs not to be argued. If any one says he can conceive of a choice, without first knowing or discerning the object chosen, he is plainly beyond the reach of argument. Not only, however, is there this a *priori* necessity that the mind can choose nothing which it does not first perceive; but,

2. As has already been hinted, the mind can only choose what is viewed as good or desirable. It can only desire what is viewed as attractive; and among the things thus viewed as pleasing or desirable, it will, if it choose freely, i.e. if it choose at all, elect that which seems best, i.e. most pleasing or desirable. Here again the exercises of the intellect are not only implicated with, they take the lead of, they guide, they in a high degree determine the exercises of will and desire. There is no such divorce between the will and intellect, and their respective actings as many have contended for. It is one and the same mind in the same complex act, discerning, desiring, wishing, choosing one and the same object. But among its faculties it is past all doubt that the understanding is, or of right ought to be, at the head. The will, including the sensibility and inclinations, is the motive energy - (hence called moral and active) like the engine of a steamship. But the understanding is the helm, the directive power which determines the course of this motive energy, and of the whole man as moved by it.

3. But if the understanding leads the will, in the sense explained, the will reacts upon and leads the intellect. Their influence is reciprocal, although that of the understanding is first in order and power. It is a familiar fact that the judgments of the intellect are much affected by our desires and preferences, our likes and dislikes. Men are very apt to think as they desire to think - as interest, taste, passion, prejudice, a friendly or unfriendly bias disposes them to think on all subjects. How constantly do they make their thinking and reasoning powers the slaves and dupes of their passions!" pages 59 and 60.

"But it may be inquired, how is it possible for the intellect, which is made to apprehend truth and evidence, to evade their force, or fail to be controlled by them? How can the will prevent the natural working of the intellect or forestall its judgments, especially since, as we have already seen, the understanding is or should be the ruling faculty? This is a fair question. In regard to the first upspring of desire and volition, it has undoubtedly been shown, that the cognitive faculties must take the lead. How then can will or desire prevent or blind the intellect? This brings us to another and most important point of correlation between conative and intellective powers, showing the influence of the former over the latter. We say then,

4. That the will largely controls the judgments of the intellect, by controlling its acts of attention. *Attention is in most cases a voluntary act.* We attend to objects, only as we will or determine so to attend to them. Hence, the world over, men ask attention to what they have to say, as if they considered such attention a purely voluntary act. Belief they do not ask for as if were at the option of the will to give or withhold it, when evidence is fairly attended to and appreciated. But they ask whether, in view of the proofs they offer, any can help believing the proposition they advocate. They treat the act of attention as depending on the will - conviction as depending upon the proofs adduced, attended to, and duly weighed." pages 61 and 62

"They who will not retain God in their knowledge, will not of course keep him in their affections. Thus we see that in most exercises of the will, the intellect and the desires are mysteriously implicated, that they interact with and upon each other in reference to all objects of choice; that the will is dependent on the intellect for light, and is governed by its views, while in turn it reacts upon the intellect, affecting its judgments, controlling its attention to the evidences and facts on which its judgments depend; in short, that it is not will alone, nor intellect alone, that is concerned in choice, but the one individual soul at once choosing as it sees, and seeing, to a great extent, as it chooses. Agreeably to this, the Scriptures teach that it is one and the same thing to love and to know God. Both are eternal life. To know him truly is to see that in

him which awakens love. To love him is impossible for those who do not thus know him.

There is indeed much knowledge which excites no desire and leads to no act of will. To know that there are innumerable sands on the seashore does not necessarily awaken any desire for them. The whole optative faculty may be indifferent to them, and to a multitude of objects. The converse, however, is not true. There can be no desire or volition without knowledge." P. 64.

And it can scarcely ^{be} doubted which is the guiding faculty. In so far as the intelligence or reason fails to have the lead, our desires, choices and actions, can neither be intelligent nor rational. We become the creatures of blind fortuitous impulse -- even as the beasts that perish. To this issue does all Scripture tend -- hence so often termed FLESH in Scripture. Neither desires nor feelings can have any moral character that are in no sense dependent on or related to reason or intelligence. If our desires and volitions become corrupt, the intelligence shares in that corruption." p. 64.

"There can be no outgoing of desire or volition without an antecedent exercise of intellect which perceives the object chosen or desired, and apprehends it as desirable or otherwise." P. 65

(Editorial note: From this last sentence the difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate is apparent. The regenerate knows God and the Christian gospel as desirable. The unregenerate may know them as undesirable.)

"Here we have the clew to one of the most undeniable and important truths of religion, while it is among the most difficult to be logically defined and explained. We refer to the blindness which the word of God everywhere ascribes to sin and unbelief; and the spiritual illumination which it affirms to take place in regeneration -- and this in regard to those truths which in some respects are perfectly known, understood, and believed. Many who know and believe speculatively the truths of Christianity are the subjects of this blindness, and need to have it dispelled before they will ever love or choose religion. How then is this to be explained? Simply thus. They discern everything in these truths but that which is most important, their infinite beauty and attractiveness, that which once apprehended at once draws the heart after it. They see everything in Christ, but that He is chief among ten thousand and altogether lovely. To them there is no form nor comeliness in Him or his religion that they should desire Him. They apprehend, in short, all but that which if seen would make them desire him, even as according to the example just noted, one may see in a tree everything but that which makes it grateful or attractive -- or a rustic would see all the words and letters of Paradise Lost, or all the parts of a splendid edifice, without detecting the element of beauty or attractiveness.

It is further true that, in these moral aesthetics -- if we so call them -- this blindness to the beauty of moral excellence is itself sin. It is mysteriously implicated with the working of desire and will. It cannot exist without a culpable closing of the eyes to the evidence in the case; it constitutes but does not excuse a material part of our depravity; it is the footing of all moral blindness which arises from the deceitfulness of sin. and is no more excusable than that state of mind in which a man sees nothing better or more desirable in virtue than in vice." P. 65-66.

Editorial note: The above quotations show that Charles Hodge held to substantially the same view of the relation of total depravity and regeneration to the intellectual activities of the soul that Clark, Hamilton et al hold. He also held to the primacy of the intellect in the same sense. Hodge says in other words just what I have been trying to say, that the change which takes place at regeneration is a change in the reaction of the soul to the truths already known, not a change in the intellectual apprehension of the truths themselves. He now loves and finds desirable those truths to which he was previously indifferent. There is no change at regeneration in the purely intellectual apprehension of what was before known. Before regeneration he may have refused to attend to certain evidence or truths because he disliked them. Not that he could not understand them, but that he would not understand them. After regeneration he now attends to those truths previously disliked, applies them to his own soul; and as Hodge says, sees their beauty and desirableness. His blindness was a wilful blindness of soul, and that is taken away at regeneration. There is no change in what was before known, but now he knows that Christ died for him and he truly believes it with saving faith. He now has experiential knowledge of the ginosko type of the saving truths of the gospel.

Floyd E. Hamilton

STUDIES OF THE DOCTRINES OF
"THE COMPLAINT"

This is the third in a series of "Studies of the Doctrines of "The Complaint". While this is specifically a reply to a paper dealing with the first of our studies in these doctrines, we judge that their paper represents the viewpoint of the other erstwhile complainants, since it claims to attempt to clarify the doctrines enunciated in "The Complaint". Therefore the doctrine of "content" enunciated in that paper by two of the erstwhile complainants is an important clarification of the epistemology basic to the "Complaint". This epistemology with its skeptical implications should be seriously considered by the committee appointed by the 13th General Assembly of The Orthodox Presbyterian Church to study the doctrines raised by "The Complaint".

(This present paper was prepared by Mr. Hamilton outside of office hours, and all materials used have been paid for by Mr. Hamilton, as was the previous paper issued by him.)

THE EFFECTS OF TOTAL DEPRAVITY AND REGENERATION ON THE INTELLECT.
SECOND PAPER

By
The Rev. Floyd E. Hamilton

In the Studies of the Doctrines of "The Complaint" two papers have appeared. The first of these had the title which appears at the head of this paper. A reply to it was circulated in January, 1947 by Mr. Arthur Kuschke and Mr. Eugene Bradford. While the paper bears only the names of these two gentlemen, we assume that it represents the point of view of the erstwhile complainants in the so-called "Clark Case" since they state that they are trying to make their misunderstood position plain. (P. 3). The spirit in which this paper is written is greatly to be appreciated. With two notable exceptions (p. 3, second main paragraph regarding "meaning" and p. 13, first main paragraph) they have shown fairness in the presentation of my views:

With a great deal of this paper, especially the quotations from Reformed writers, we are in hearty agreement. In fact were the use and meaning of terms mutually understood, one could not but feel that the fundamental positions of the two parties to the discussion are not far apart, and though they charge me with holding a heretical view regarding total depravity, in reality such a charge is due to a misunderstanding of my position.

That paper contains what seem to be important admissions or at least clarifications of the doctrinal position of the erstwhile complainants in the Clark Case. Though much of their argument seems to contradict these admissions; they (1) specifically deny holding to any skeptical view regarding the possibility of knowing real truth and knowing God; (2) they disclaim belief in the so-called "faculty psychology", though as will be shown, that view seems to permeate their paper. For instance, they say (p. 12) that Mr. Hamilton claims to hold that the whole soul is depraved, and centers that depravity in the will, but since he claims that the whole soul is depraved he must logically believe that the intellect too is depraved. In such a statement, since I never have said that the will and not the intellect was depraved, it is clear that they still tend to think of the intellect and will as separate faculties of the soul. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the soul does not have a separate intellect; it is intelligent. The soul does not have a will; it wills actions. (3) They assert their belief in historical faith, which is intellectual understanding of and intellectual belief in the doctrines of the Christian religion without saving faith in Christ. (p. 6, 12 lines from the bottom, and the excellent description of historical faith on p. 7, last half of first paragraph.) If they believe in historical faith they really have admitted the chief point of our contention, though unfortunately they continue to argue as though historical faith were impossible. (4) They admit that an unregenerated man can have an understanding of spiritual truths. Now as Dr. Clark says, "When we say a man has an understanding, (even an understanding) of the meaning of a sentence, we do not refer to the fact that he goes through some mental gymnastics. Another may go through similar gymnastics and not have an understanding of the words. We mean that he knows the meaning. Their decision to avoid a discussion of meaning takes them completely off the subject under discussion." (c.f. p. 3, second main paragraph of their paper. Also p. 11, fifth line). We submit that if a man has an understanding of a truth, he knows the meaning or he has no understanding of it. If he understands something different, he does not understand the meaning at all. So if they admit that an unregenerated man has even "an" understanding of the meaning of a spiritual truth, he must know the meaning or he just doesn't understand the meaning at all. Of course a regenerated man knows more about the truth in question because he has appropriated it to his soul's spiritual needs, but he still understands the same meaning that the unregenerated man understood, plus all its implications for a Christian.

After reading all these admissions one begins to wonder if the whole dispute is not "much ado about nothing"! Were it not for the fact that they make such admissions as the above and then proceed to argue as though they had either forgotten the admissions or did not understand the meaning of what they had admitted, there would be no point to prolonging the debate. Certainly the charges of error at a crucial point in Reformed theology, namely total depravity and regeneration, cannot be allowed to go unchallenged even though they are based on a misunderstanding. It is to be hoped that this paper will so clarify the issues that no further discussion will be necessary.

THE MEANING OF CONTENT

The writers have done a real service by defining their terms and telling us how they expect to use them. If they had also defined "truth" or "a truth" and had defined "meaning", it would have been better, but we are grateful for what they have given us. One term which is crucial to the whole discussion is "content", and it is in defining that term that the epistemological theory held by the erstwhile complainants is made abundantly plain. Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford define "content" as "a mind's possession of or grasp of an object of thought. (p. 2, lines 13, 14). This seems to refer to the mode of knowing, though they deny it, for it is the mind's grasp of the object of knowledge.

It would seem that the mind's grasping would more exactly set forth what they have in mind at this point. Perhaps it might better be called the mind's container rather than content.

But we are introduced immediately to what seems to be a contradictory idea, for on p.2, line 10, they say that the content is the representation in the mind of the object of knowledge (see also p. 2, 11 lines from the bottom). This idea is then developed at some length, and it would seem to be their final view of the meaning of "content". (It is not clear, how, on their theory, the object of knowledge can become a representation in the mind, if the soul cannot know truth directly. Nor is it entirely clear whether their object of knowledge is a physical object or the mental object, i.e., a thing or a proposition. Dr. Clark has a pertinent comment which should be made at this point: "On page 10, they speak of understanding a single word. I have contended that a single word is neither true nor false. "Sinners" all by itself is not an object of knowledge. The object of knowledge is a truth. And a truth is a combination of a subject and a predicate. They regularly argue as if a single physical object, or a single concept could be a truth. There is no sense in saying (literally) that we can understand "Christ". We may use such language colloquially, but we mean that we can understand that "Christ died for sinners" or "Christ is Lord" or "Christ was born in Bethlehem". Kuschke and Bradford et al always fight shy of speaking of a truth. If they want to talk of truth, they regularly talk of Truth, the whole system of truth. They never come to grips with a single truth.")

If this representation theory is the one to which they really hold, then it begins to become clear why they have persistently disagreed with our position. This epistemological theory of a representation in the mind of the object of knowledge, has some very dubious antecedents. It is said to have been held by Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes and Kant, according to Ledger Wood, ("The Analysis of Knowledge", Chapter One, Princeton University Press). All these philosophers can hardly be called Christian. Of course that fact does not in itself necessarily condemn it (except on the position of the erstwhile complainants which is that unbelievers cannot understand the same meaning of a proposition that believers can), but the fact that it is said to have been held by these non-Christian philosophers should at least make us cautious about accepting it without close examination.

According to this representative theory of knowledge there is (1) the knowing subject, (2) the content of knowledge, or the representation formed in the mind of the object of knowledge (p. 2, 11 lines from the bottom) and (3) the object of knowledge. (We observe in passing that the erstwhile complainants now hold an entirely different meaning of "content" than was held in the "Complaint". In that document p. 7, col. 3, "This knowing of propositions cannot, in the nature of the case, reflect or inspire any recognition by man of his relation to God, for the simple reason that the propositions have the same content, mean the same, to God and man," Thus content of propositions was then identified with the meaning of propositions. Now, in this last paper, it is not the meaning of a proposition, but the representation formed in the mind of the object of knowledge, which is the content. According to this epistemological theory now espoused by Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford, the soul never really comes in direct contact with the truth itself, but only with the content of knowledge which is the "representation" formed in the mind of the object of knowledge. Nor is this representation an exact replica of the truth, for Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford argue (p.8, center paragraph) that the soul brings to the content something which "flows from the knowing mind itself" and coalesces with the representation of the object and causes it to be qualitatively different from the meaning of the object of knowledge itself. It is right here that the objectionable feature of their theory begins to manifest itself. If this content is always qualitatively different from the objective truth, because of what "flows from the knowing mind itself" the knowing mind can never know the real truth but only that which is qualitatively different from the real truth. All that we have previously argued regarding the skeptical implications of their views applies with equal force against this new exposition of their position.

At any rate it now is quite clear why they have always insisted that God's understanding of the meaning of a proposition is qualitatively different from man's understanding of that meaning, and also why they insist that the understanding of the meaning of a proposition by an unregenerate man is never the same as the understanding of that meaning by a regenerate man. On this theory of a qualitatively different "content" the understanding of the meaning of a proposition by two regenerate men could never even be the same!

Now while Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford deny that they hold skeptical views regarding the possibility of knowing truth, and assert that the objective truth is the same for any two individuals, is it not plain that they never can know the real truth according to their theory? They do not know the objective truth which is, they say, the same for two individuals. All that they know is the representation formed in their minds of the truth, and that representation is not identical with the objective truth because it is changed by something that "flows from the knowing mind itself"! Thus, in spite of their assertions that man can know God's truth, according to their theory it is never God's truth that the mind knows, but only the representation, the qualitatively different represen-

tation, that is formed in his mind by the something that "flows from the knowing mind itself". They have denied holding to skepticism but they have unwittingly brought it in by the back door. If the soul never knows the objective truth directly, but knows only the representation in his mind of that truth, and if that representation in his mind is always qualitatively different because of what "flows from the knowing mind itself", from the objective truth and the truth which is in God's mind, are we not landed again in the abysmal depths of skepticism, in spite of their denials to the contrary? How can they ever know what the objective truth, God's truth, is if they know only a qualitatively different representation of it in their own minds? Yes, how can they even know that it is qualitatively different if they cannot know the truth directly so that they can compare it with the representation which they say they know?

Now we (Clark, Hamilton et al) escape this morass of skepticism because we believe that the mind knows the truth, God's truth, directly if it knows anything truly. The mode of knowing that truth is different for God and man, but it is the same truth known by both and possessed by both, without making man and God identical or making truth independent of God. God's being is inviolate to prying minds, for man can know only God or His revelation as God chooses to reveal truth to man. We deny that there is such a thing as a "content of knowledge" or "representation formed in the mind as something different from the proposition or truth known. The content of the proposition is just the meaning of the proposition, and that meaning is the same for all men and for God. The content and object of knowledge are identical.

The theory of the erstwhile complainants would not be so objectionable if the alleged representation in the mind were exactly to correspond with objective truth; but what makes it primarily objectionable is the fact that it is always qualitatively different for man and God. That means that man could never know the true meaning possessed by God. It means that two people, regenerated or unregenerated can never know the same truth, for what they know is always a qualitatively different representation of it in their minds.

THE BEARING OF THIS "CONTENT" ON OUR SUBJECT.

It is now clear why they have insisted that the unregenerated man can never understand the same meaning of a proposition that regenerated men can understand. On this epistemological theory it would be impossible for any two men to have the same meaning. That "which flows from the knowing mind itself" always makes the representation in the minds of two men qualitatively different, whether those men be regenerated or not.

But since the soul, on this theory, does not know the truth directly but only knows the representation in the mind itself, and that representation is always qualitatively different for God and man, it will always be impossible to know the truth which God knows, and we are again in the depths of skepticism. In reality solipsism is the only logical end of such a skeptical theory, for the knowing subject is hopelessly imprisoned in his own mind where God's truth as it really is never can penetrate. It is always changed before he can know it.

THE EFFECT OF TOTAL DEPRAVITY ON THE SOUL

As I understand their argument, the fundamental objection which they voice to my paper is that if the soul is totally depraved, the intellect must also be depraved, and therefore it is impossible for the unregenerated man to have the same understanding of spiritual truth that a regenerated man has. They claim that if an unregenerated man could have the same understanding of spiritual truth which a regenerated man has, his depravity would not extend to the intellect and therefore would not be total for it would not extend to the whole soul, and all its attributes. (Note the tacit assumption of the validity of the faculty psychology in this charge. We will have more to say about this point later.)

In reply to this charge, which is really one of serious heresy, let it be distinctly understood that we do believe that total depravity does extend to the whole soul and therefore has its effect upon the intellectual activities of the soul. But the classic statement of the Reformed position is that depravity is total because it extends to every part of a man, not because a man is as bad as he possibly can be. Even they deny that man's intellect is destroyed (p. 6, bottom paragraph), therefore we both believe that the intellect still is able to reason and understand propositions (I prefer to think this is what they really believe rather than the conclusions to which their false epistemology analysed above would logically lead them.) But the precise point at issue in this debate is as to just what effect depravity has on intellectual activity. We believe that one of the effects of total depravity is that it makes it difficult to understand the meaning of propositions and argument (even for regenerated men as witness the misunderstandings in this present debate) As an effect of depravity we often make mistakes in reasoning and commit logical

logical fallacies, as Dr. Clark has repeatedly asserted. Another effect of depravity is that sinful pride or prejudice often prevents one from accepting conclusions that are obvious to other people. Then depravity makes it easy to believe evil because men love evil rather than good. Depravity even makes thinking itself difficult and for some almost impossible. As a result of depravity some people are more stupid intellectually than others, and all men, especially before regeneration, are prone to think evil thoughts. (That is where the truth of the many quotations from Scripture given correctly by the writers of the "Reply" apply.) The quality of evil permeates even the correct thoughts of an unregenerated man because even his relatively good thoughts are sinful since they are the thoughts of a man who is in rebellion against God and His law. Nor does the regenerated man escape this entirely for the presence of sin is still with him till death. (On the premises of the "Reply" the thoughts of the regenerated man would seem to be free from the effects of depravity entirely.)

But while we admit, yea, insist on all these and other effects of depravity on the thinking of an unregenerated man, that does not mean that a man can never reason correctly about anything, nor does it mean that he will always reason correctly after he is regenerated. Total depravity does not mean that an unregenerated man can never understand the true meaning of a spiritual proposition. As a matter of fact regeneration does not always necessarily improve a person's ability immediately to understand propositions, for there are some Christians who never till their dying day seem to grasp certain spiritual truths, while intellectually keen unbelievers are able to understand them perfectly. Of course it is true that uneducated men who know their Bibles and have saving faith in Jesus Christ are so illuminated by the indwelling Spirit that they can correctly expound the meaning of Scripture while unbelievers usually do not grasp those meanings or at least do not relate them to the system of truth contained in the Word of God. But all this is beside the point at issue. The real issue is whether it is impossible for any unregenerated man to grasp the true meaning of the proposition, "Christ died for sinners." The issue is not whether he understands all the Christian implications of such a proposition, or whether he understands the meaning in an experiential way, appropriating it to his own soul. The issue is whether he understands the true meaning of the proposition itself. Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford say "No!" I say "Yes!" I do not say that an unregenerated man always understands that true meaning, but that it is possible for some men so to understand it before regeneration. (At this point I wish to qualify the phrase "with the same ease" found on page 32 of the "Answer". It was doubtless an unfortunate phrase, for it would seem not to take account of the deadening effects of depravity on the brains of many if not all of the unregenerated. Those effects are only progressively removed after regeneration. What was meant was that if the regenerated and the unregenerated both understand the true meaning of the proposition "Christ died for sinners" then there is no difference in the meaning understood, though the regenerated will know it as a fact of personal experience, while the unregenerated will only know it intellectually.) The point at issue is whether an unregenerated man can ever grasp the true meaning. Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford say that he can "have an understanding" (p. 11, first paragraph) but that it is not an "adequate understanding". But is the understanding which he has true or not? If true, then how does the truth change with regeneration? Is an understanding true or isn't it true? If we say it is true before regeneration, then how is that understanding changed except by personal appropriation of the truth to his own soul's needs?

Nor will it do to say that such a soul can think accurately and truly in the so-called "natural" realm but not in the spiritual realm, for on their own premises depravity should so affect all intellectual processes that one could not understand any proposition truly, no matter how simple it might be. Even $2 + 2 = 4$ ought to be qualitatively different for the two men. (The underlying assumption that God is not the creator is changed, but not the proposition or the understanding of the proposition so that it has a different meaning after regeneration.) Is it not plain that such a position leads to absurdity?

WHAT REGENERATION ADDS TO INTELLECTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF TRUTH.

Now to the intellectual understanding of the truth which may be the same for the regenerated or the unregenerated is added saving faith in the spiritual truths of the gospel. The regenerated man not only intellectually understands it and intellectually believes it; he appropriates it with his whole soul and knows it experientially in the "ginosko" sense. Regeneration adds experiential understanding of truth to the intellectual understanding already possessed. He now has appreciation for the beauty and value of all spiritual truths which he may have previously understood intellectually. As Hodge (Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 33) says, before regeneration, "He may have an intellectual knowledge of the facts and doctrines of the Bible, but no spiritual discernment of their excellence, and no delight in them." But if that intellectual understanding of the truth was true, then that true understanding will be unchanged after regeneration.

Regeneration is "something which lies lower than consciousness." (Hodge, Vol. III, p. 32). It changes the orientation of the soul toward God and God's truth. The unregenerated man's thoughts are evil continually. Some are evil intrinsically, but all his thoughts are evil because they are

ignoring God and His law. An example should make this clear. Suppose a thief sees a five dollar bill lying on a desk. Intellectually he understands truly that it is a five dollar bill. He understands truly that he should not steal it. Such thoughts are the same for the regenerated or the unregenerated. But the thief covets the bill and decides to steal it. His correct thoughts about the bill become mixed with his evil thoughts about it, and his thoughts are thus oriented against God and His law. An unregenerated man's thoughts are a constant mixture of true and correct thoughts which themselves are unchanged after he becomes regenerated, and evil reactions or thoughts toward correctly understood propositions. The total depravity of his soul manifests itself, among other points, in the fact that even true thoughts, that is truly understood propositions, are all the thoughts of a totally depraved man who is oriented away from God and His law. When regenerated his orientation changes though the thoughts that were true in themselves before remain intrinsically unchanged after regeneration.

Now this does not mean that an unregenerated man is incapable of reasoning correctly though he may make logical fallacies and because of sinful prejudices may refuse to see or understand spiritual truth; it means that logically correct reasoning is the reasoning of a totally depraved man, and though such reasoning may be identical with the logically correct reasoning of a regenerated man, all such logically true reasoning is sinful because it is the reasoning of a soul in rebellion against God.

TOTAL DEPRAVITY FURTHER DISCUSSED.

But let us examine total depravity a little more deeply. It primarily concerns the orientation of the soul to God, as was said above. The man who is dead in sin is dead toward God. He either hates God or is indifferent toward Him. He does not live as God's child who owes love and obedience to Him. His soul is in total rebellion against God. He is totally alienated from God. That does not mean that he cannot understand correctly spiritual truths. Why, it is conceivable that such a man might have an accurate intellectual understanding of the whole system of Christian doctrine without having saving faith and therefore having the kind of experiential understanding of the "ginosko" type that only a regenerated man can have. If he had historical faith he might even believe in truth of the Christian religion without saving faith in Christ.

Those who hold the views of Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford face a dilemma. Either they must say that total depravity so affects every phase of the thinking process that an unregenerated man could never understand any proposition truly, which is absurd, or they must say that in certain realms such men can think truly, in which case, on their premises, the depravity would be only partial! We escape both horns of the dilemma because we hold that while total depravity affects every intellectual activity, in the ways previously mentioned, it does not always make it impossible to understand even spiritual propositions truly and correctly.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITIONS CORRECTLY AND THE SOUL'S REACTION TOWARD UNDERSTOOD PROPOSITIONS.

Much of the confusion apparent in the thinking of Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford seems to stem from the fact that they do not seem to see the difference between the soul's purely intellectual understanding of a proposition and the soul's reaction to such propositions when correctly understood. When an unregenerated man understands a proposition in the spiritual realm he has the unregenerated man's reaction toward it, while the regenerated man has a regenerated man's reaction toward it.

Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford say that something "flows from the knowing mind itself," to coalesce with the representation of the object of knowledge formed in the mind, and to become the "content" which the mind knows. (Soul and mind are here used as synonyms.) But what they have really done is to fail to distinguish between the truth understood correctly, and the soul's reaction toward it. When a new proposition is correctly understood by the unregenerated man and also by a regenerated man their reaction is totally different. Their different knowledge of the subject enables each one to fit the understood proposition into his own different scheme of philosophy or theology. In so doing each reacts differently. One sees Christian implications and believes it with saving faith; the other does not. One loves it; the other hates it or despises it or is indifferent to it. One applies it to his soul's needs; the other regards it as foolishness.

But the soul's reaction to such truth correctly understood does not necessarily affect the actual understanding of the meaning of the proposition itself. The two souls simply make different propositions about the mutually understood meaning. These different reactions or propositions must not in any way be confused (as Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford do) with the mutually understood meaning. It is because each knowing subject has different reactions to such mutually understood propositions, knows different implications and sees different relationships to separate intellectual systems, that the knowledge of one person is always different in extent from the knowledge of another.

person. When two individuals understand the same meaning of a proposition, if one is unregenerated, his understanding is morally different from the understanding of the regenerated man. If the true meaning of the proposition is understood by an unregenerated man that understanding of the meaning does not change the instant he is regenerated. Nor does he know new or different propositions the instant he is regenerated. He believes them with saving faith.

THINKING AND WILLING

Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford assert that I teach that the will is totally depraved while the intellect is only partially depraved. (Again notice their assumption of the truth of the faculty psychology, since the language is theirs not mine.) They do not seem to realize that willing and thinking are inextricably intertwined. When we will an action we think it first (if it is a conscious action.) We cannot will anything without first and simultaneously thinking it. And we cannot think without willing to think. In each case it is the soul willing or thinking. Only logically can we separate thinking from willing. The soul wills to think good thoughts or evil thoughts. In every conscious thought we will to think, and in every action willed we think it first.

But there is a world of difference between willing to think true thoughts and reacting to such true thoughts in an evil attitude. One way in which total depravity manifests itself is in evil reactions toward even true thoughts or true propositions correctly understood. The depravity is logically prior to every conscious intellectual activity. It is throughout the soul (to use a spatial term of a non-spatial soul). Even in correctly understanding the proposition "Christ died for sinners" the unregenerated man reacts evilly, for he thinks, "I won't have Christ as my Saviour," and similarly evil thoughts. All such evil thoughts may be his reaction to the correctly understood proposition "Christ died for sinners." Willing is inextricably mixed with thinking in this whole process, but it is the soul doing both, and it is the soul which is depraved.

THE UNITY OF THE SOUL

Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford state: "Mr. Hamilton's view that regeneration may bring "no change at all" in the understanding of the words 'Christ died for sinners' is easily refuted by one simple consideration. It is this: since the entire soul is corrupted by sin, and since the entire soul is renewed by regeneration, then regeneration must bring a change in the understanding of the words, 'Christ died for sinners'". (p. 11)

This paragraph is the crux of their contention. Depravity would not be total but partial were there no change in the understanding of such a proposition, after regeneration. We may well ask, "Point out to us just what different meaning he understands the instant after regeneration," But they would doubtless reply; "We can't tell you, but there must be a change because the whole soul is renewed." Well that is just assuming the thing to be proved. Unless they are prepared to say that the thinking process does not exist before regeneration, and that all thoughts are true and without error after regeneration, how can they insist that depravity in order to be total must mean that an unregenerated man cannot think the same true thought that he thinks after he is regenerated?

But before we discuss the unity of the soul we must point out a shifting of terms in their use of the term "understanding", on p. 11 and elsewhere. I have held that there is no necessary change in the understanding of the proposition, "Christ died for sinners" after regeneration, which they twist into the charge that, "Mr. Hamilton insists that no change at all in the understanding necessarily follows regeneration." This latter charge is false. "The understanding" is another name for the soul thinking, and of course in that sense the understanding is depraved. "Understanding the proposition" is entirely different. Unless our authors are prepared to assert that the unregenerated cannot think at all, they must see that there is a vast difference between "the understanding" and "understanding the true meaning of a proposition" which is something the totally depraved understanding can do in spite of its total depravity.

But in this whole argument, especially on page 11, notice how guilty they are of assuming the validity of the faculty psychology (no doubt unconsciously)! In discussing total depravity they say (correctly) "corruption pervades the whole soul in all its life, powers and activities." They then go on to say, "It is this very meaning that is endangered by Mr. Hamilton's refusal to acknowledge any necessary change in the understanding due to regeneration." Well, of course I do assert a change in "the understanding" as was said above, but our concern now is to point out the fact that they use the term "the understanding" as equivalent to "intellect" and set it over against the "will". They assume a faculty of the soul called "the understanding" which is not the whole soul, and then assert that I do not extend total depravity to that part of the soul!! Again I insist that the depraved soul may have a correct understanding of the proposition, but that the depraved soul has no separate faculty called "the understanding" not affected by regeneration.

Inasmuch as they have stated that I did not document my charge in my previous paper that they assume the validity of this so-called "faculty psychology" (p. 6), let me point out that it is unnecessary to go to the other documents for the evidence which is pervasive. The evidence is abundant in this "Reply" to my article. It permeates all their argument against my position, but here are a few of the most glaring examples: Page 4, middle paragraph, "So it is taught in the passage as a whole that regeneration changes the will but not the understanding." Since I did not separate the will from the understanding, obviously they are assuming that it is a separate faculty. Again on page 6, first paragraph, "We approve of the many statements he makes in his paper concerning the positive changes brought about by regeneration --in the will..." Since I did not speak of changes in the will, this must be their own assumption of the distinction between the will and the rest of the soul. Page 12, line 6, "Mr. Hamilton emphasizes the depravity of the will." I did not do this, so they must be separating the will from the soul in their own thinking. P. 12, bottom two paragraphs the same assumption is made in at least six instances. One of them is as follows: "The unregenerate man reacts against the gospel with his intellect, will and affections, with his entire heart." This is clearly breaking up the personality. In fact much of the specious plausibility of some of their arguments is due to the fact that they arbitrarily separate the intellect from the rest of the soul and then assert that I do not extend depravity or regeneration to it. They assert that I center depravity on the will alone, though I never separate the intellect or the will from the soul which is totally depraved. I must reiterate that the whole soul is depraved, and that this depravity conditions all its activities, but that does not mean that the soul cannot think at all, nor that it cannot at times think correctly. If it does, then to that extent it continues to think correctly and grasps a meaning which does not change at the instant of regeneration.

Now certainly there is a change in "the understanding" i.e., the soul, at regeneration. The precise point at issue is what that change is. I hold that among many other changes one primary change is in its orientation to God and His law. Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford hold that the change is in the understanding of the meaning of a proposition. While I believe that there quite often is such a change shortly after regeneration, due to other factors, and to the fact that the true meaning of the proposition was not previously understood, it is not a necessary change. What different meaning does a man know after regeneration in a proposition such as 2 plus 2 equals 4? Until our friends can point out such a new meaning that he grasps after regeneration, they are talking in the air. To be sure he reacts with other propositions to a proposition such as "Christ died for sinners" but if he understood the meaning before regeneration he understands at least that same meaning after regeneration.

AN ALLEGED CHANGE IN MR. HAMILTON'S VIEWS.

Our authors charge (p.15) that Mr. Hamilton has changed his views regarding the exegesis of Ephesians 1:17-18 since he came under the influence of "Dr. Clark's erroneous view of the intellect." A quotation from an article in the Guardian of Sept. 25, 1942 is compared with my exegesis of the same verses in the previous paper. Were it not for the fact that they have involved Dr. Clark, it would be unnecessary to answer this charge, since a change in ones views is never reprehensible, unless it is for the worse. Why, one of the authors of this recent paper has even changed sides in the present controversy. It would not at all be surprising if, when the present controversy was not envisaged unguarded statements had been made.

But as a matter of fact there is good evidence to show that my views have not changed substantially. At about the same time the Guardian article appeared, I was writing a series entitled "Responsive Readings" based on the Shorter Catechism. In commenting of Question 30 of the Catechism the following was written:

Question: "Can we believe in Christ without regeneration?"

Answer: Saving faith in Christ is impossible unless one is already born again of the Spirit, but intellectual belief in Christ without submission to Him as Saviour and Lord of one's whole life is possible without regeneration, for 'the devils believe and tremble' "

Note that these words were written at approximately the same time that the Guardian article was written so the views therein expressed cannot be as contradictory as Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford assert. As a matter of fact the passage they quoted was wrenched from its context. The whole article should be read to grasp the relation of the sentences quoted to it. The first section analyzes the word "kardia" showing that in 144 times at least it is used with reference to the whole soul or personality, and that the words "pseuche", "pneuma" and "dianoia" (the word used in Eph. 4:18 for the "understanding"), all are used with almost the same meaning, and that they all mean the whole soul, or spirit or mind of man as one and the same thing. Now in speaking of "kardia" "heart", the following was stated: "The heart, then, is the commonest term used in the New Testament for

what we commonly call the mind or soul, the "ego" or "I" which controls the body. In this passage in Ephesians, the picturesque phrase 'eyes of your heart' is used to indicate the intellectual perception of the mind, comparable to the physical eyes of the body. When this term is used probably the affection of the soul is the characteristic that is particularly emphasized. 'Enlightened'. When our hearts or our minds are enlightened they are enabled to perceive intellectually certain truths which call forth love for God in the individual. This must come from the Holy Spirit." "When the Holy Spirit enlightens our understanding" (notice the use of the noun as the equivalent of the whole soul) "are enabled to realize and desire the holiness of character which is to be ours in the future, because we see our sinful selves and the glorious sinlessness to which God has called us in salvation. Without such spiritual enlightenment there would be no desire for sinlessness." "Only those who have their hearts opened and enlightened by the Holy Spirit can appreciate and desire holiness of life."

I agree with our authors that this is sound exegesis, but it certainly does not contradict my present view. Notice (1) "The understanding" should be translated "heart" and refers to the whole soul, not merely the intellect (as the faculty psychologists would hold). (2) In the use of the term "the eyes of your heart" while the intellectual perception of the soul is referred to, the affection of the soul is particularly emphasized. (3) The enlightening of the heart refers to the whole soul and teaches that when it takes place we perceive that certain truths call forth love for God and are made to desire holiness of character. Incidentally the verses refer to Christians not to non-Christians so the change is not the change of regeneration, but subsequent to it, so that if there were a change of understanding the meaning of a proposition, it would be after regeneration, not at the time of regeneration.

Now while this article on Ephesians 1:18 was written before the present controversy it actually teaches that the effect of spiritual enlightenment of the whole soul is an experiential one, relating intellectually perceived truths to one's soul and appropriating them to one's spiritual needs. It is the same thought I have insisted is in the New Testament word "ginosko", namely experiential knowledge which the unregenerated do not have. The enlightenment of the soul is subsequent to regeneration and a part of the sanctification process. It enables one to apply truths intellectually understood to one's spiritual needs.

QUOTATIONS FROM REFORMED AUTHORS.

Our authors give many quotations from Reformed theologians which are excellent but entirely beside the precise point at issue. Of course we must always remember that these things were written without the present controversy in mind and therefore the terminology is not carefully guarded. For example, the quotation from Charles Hodge shows that there is a fundamental difference between the knowledge of a regenerated man and the knowledge of an unregenerated man. But who denies it? Dr. Clark and I have insisted upon it. Why is it so difficult for the erstwhile complainants to see that there is a difference between the "knowledge" of men and the "understanding the meaning of a proposition? Knowledge includes far more than the understanding of the meaning of a proposition.

The long quotation from Jonathan Edwards on page 9, regarding spiritual understanding is excellent. What he calls "spiritual understanding" I have called "experiential knowledge" which only the regenerated can have.

Shedd, quoted on page 10, contrasts "experimental knowledge" with the knowledge of the unregenerated man. He means "experiential" knowledge, and of course only the regenerated can have it. The quotation from Thornwell, p. 10, presents almost the same idea.

When Mr. Kuschke and Mr. Bradford quote from such writers they continually miss the point that we all agree that the knowledge of the regenerated man and the knowledge of the unregenerated man are radically different. That is not the point at issue. The point is whether a man who understands the true meaning of a proposition, understands a different meaning after he is regenerated. As Dr. Clark says, Saul, before he was converted understood the meaning of the proposition, Jesus is Lord, but didn't believe it. Did he understand a different meaning of the same proposition after the instant of regeneration? He soon learned more propositions but the true meaning he knew before, he continued to know after conversion.

EXEGESIS

There is extensive exegesis of Scripture passages in their paper, on the assumption that these Scripture passages support their position. All through them there is the same misunderstanding of this fundamental distinction between the knowledge of the regenerate and the unregenerate which is different, and the understanding of the true meaning of a proposition by the regenerate and the unregenerated which may be the same.

There is also a failure to recognize the fact that "the mind" as used in Scripture is just another name for "the soul". (Cf. p. 12 regarding the use of mind in II Cor. 4:4; 3:14; Titus 1:15; I Tim. 6:5.) Of course the mind (the soul) is blind, defiled, and corrupt. Of course we are new creatures, II Cor. 5:16-17 (P. 13). What bearing does this admitted fact have on the question as to whether a man who understands the true meaning of a proposition understands a different meaning the instant after he has been regenerated?

In their exegesis of certain passages such as Rom. 3:11 they prove too much. If this passage means that an unregenerated man cannot understand anything, the thought is absurd and contradicts their position that the unregenerated man has "ability to think and reason" (p.6, bottom). Our friends cannot eat their cake and have it too. This passage in Rom. 3:11 clearly teaches according to Thayer, "there is no man of understanding, that is, no good and upright man" (as having knowledge of the things that pertain to salvation in the experiential sense.) This is the doctrine for which I have been contending.

Were there time it would be tempting to examine their exegesis of other passages, but the ones given are typical. If our argument has been understood up to this point, one can readily detect the careless shifting of terms that takes place in their treatment of various passages. Take for example the sentence, "The word 'knowledge' (epignosin), or precise and accurate knowledge, must certainly include intellectual knowledge." (p. 15, lines 18-19). One may well say, "what of it?" Who denies it? Certainly not I. The word "epignosin" is from the root of "ginosko" and therefore includes experiential knowledge as well as intellectual knowledge.

A DEFINITE MISREPRESENTATION

There is one gross misrepresentation that is hard to explain unless it be intentional. In the second paragraph on p. 13, they discuss my exegesis of "ginosko" and state toward the close, "But the principal force of ginosko is in the idea of intellectual understanding - not 'purely' intellectual understanding, but intellectual understanding - and this idea cannot be suppressed or eliminated from ginosko, yet this is just what Mr. Hamilton tries to do." Note carefully the closing clause.

Now the only way they can lend even a specious plausibility to this misrepresentation is by omitting in their quotation from my paper the very sentence which particularly includes the evidence that I did not seek to suppress or eliminate the idea of intellectual understanding from "ginosko" which, they say, "is just what Mr. Hamilton tries to do."

Their quotation from my article denotes the omitted sentences by the convenient symbol, "...". They could not by any stretch of the imagination have overlooked the sentence, for they quote the sentences immediately preceding and following the omitted sentences.

The omitted sentences are as follows: "This word in its various forms is used at least 203 times in the New Testament. In at least 187 instances of its use this word always means not merely 'intellectual understanding' but understanding plus belief, apprehension and experiential knowledge of that which is intellectually understood." Note the three underlined words all of which refer to intellectual understanding in this short sentence! Is that trying to suppress or eliminate the idea of intellection from ginoko?" Comment would seem unnecessary.

CONCLUSION

Though their position in this recent article would seem to imply a skeptical view regarding the possibility of knowing truth, they have denied holding to skepticism. Though there is abundant evidence that the faculty psychology is basic to their attack on my position, they have denied holding to it. Though their view of total depravity would seem to indicate that they believe that a man who is totally depraved cannot reason or think any true thought, they have asserted that an unregenerate man has the ability to think and reason (p.6, bottom). Though their whole line of argument would indicate that they deny the reality of historical faith, they nevertheless say they believe in it. If they really believe in historical faith, then there is really nothing for us to argue about, for they have admitted the principal point for which we have been contending. Just what do they believe? Let us be charitable and take their positive assertions. Most serious, however is their representation theory of knowledge. It is now clear that they have introduced an element into their epistemology which is, to say the least, not in the Reformed tradition. The amazing fact is that this strange idea of "content" as being the representation in the mind of the object of knowledge, with all its skeptical implications, has been made a test of orthodoxy and the basis of a complaint against presbytery! The church, instead of being concerned about Dr. Clark should be concerned with keeping the church free from this error of apparently pagan origin. "Ye shall know the truth" not a representation in the mind that is qualitatively different from the truth.